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1 Introduction
In recent years, a global consensus has emerged that explicit long-term targets for the
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are meaningful for promoting the mitigation
of climate change. For example, both the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 and the Paris
Agreement in 2015 make explicit reference to a 2-degree long-term target for global
warming.1 The European Union currently pursues the target of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels), and the group of G7
countries agreed to reduce emissions by 40 to 70% by 2050 (compared to 2010 levels).
Targets such as these can help pollution abatement in the long run by promoting
large-scale investments in research and development of new technologies that will be
deployed only in the (distant) future, such as nuclear fusion or carbon capture from the
air.
Does themere existence of a long-term targetmake countriesmorewilling to engage
in an international environmental agreement (IEA) in the near term? The answer to this
question is not clear because compliance with the target cannot be taken for granted.
What seems clear, however, is that meeting the long-term targets mentioned above will
require a series of technological breakthroughs to achieve a decoupling of economic
growth and carbon emissions. In that sense, the existence of a long-term target – for as
ambitious or idealistic as it may seem – raises an expectation among the stakeholders
that breakthroughs will eventually occur. This feature of targets begs the question of
how expectations about cooperation in the future can influence the formation of IEAs
in the present. The literature on self-enforcing treaties has highlighted the role of
coordination when participation in an IEAs hinges upon a tipping point (Barrett, 2003,
2006)2 but little is known so far about how coordination can be achieved when treaty
1In addition, the Paris Agreement also states the need for “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5 degrees Celcius above pre-industrial levels.”
2The concept of tipping points used in this context relates to the seminal work by Thomas Schelling
(1978). For a more recent, informal treatment, see the book by Malcolm Gladwell (2000)
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formation takes place over time.
This study shows that expectations about collective pollution abatement in the
future can influence the formation of IEAs even in the near term. We model treaty
formation as a dynamic game of technology choice where country behavior is con-
ditioned by a network externality associated with one of the abatement technologies,
and by switching costs that are convex in the number of countries that switch tech-
nologies. The model gives rise to two types of equilibrium dynamics of technology
adoption. In the first case, adoption follows a determinate path which leads to either
full cooperation or no cooperation, depending on the initial state. In the second case,
the dynamics are indeterminate, with stable paths leading to both full cooperation and
no cooperation. The path chosen depends on countries’ expectations. That is, the size
of a self-enforcing treaty is driven to some extent by subjective beliefs that countries
hold about their ability to coordinate policies. This case emerges when countries are
patient, face a low switching cost, and when there are high scale effects of operational
cost. In the case of climate change, such an indeterminacy in the adoption of abatement
technologies provides a rationale for negotiating long-term abatement targets that align
expectations of countries on mutually beneficial diffusion trajectories.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a basic two-stage model
with frontrunner and follower countries of a new abatement technology to illustrate
how indeterminate dynamics could emerge. Next, we generalize the model by allowing
countries to choose the timing of treaty adoption. We discuss both a two-period version
of the model (in Section 3.1) and an infinite-horizon game (in Section 3.2), and derive
the equilibrium dynamics in Section 3.3. Section 4 discusses the results of the model,
and concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
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2 A model of technology adoption with frontrunner
and follower countries
We consider the formation of an IEA that regulates pollution abatement by multiple
technological options. Here, we set the focus of the model discussions on the adoption
of a technology that involves a network externality. Network externalities are known to
create strategic complementarities that may lead to tipping points. Our model focuses
on the diffusion process of an abatement technology which is not instantaneous but
occurs over time. In combination with the network externality, the delay engenders
strategic uncertainty about future adoption decisions, transforming coordination on
the good outcome into a non-trivial problem.3
Network externalities have been alleged to play a role for various IEAs. For
example, Barrett (2003, Chapter 9) discusses the equipment standards for oil tankers set
by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution fromShips (MARPOL),
which aim to reduce oil discharge to the sea at the time of exchange of ballast water and
oil in the tank. With the equipment standards, tanker owners reap greater benefits from
installing new equipment as more ports comply with the agreement, hence favoring
higher participation in the treaty after the group of participating countries reaches a
critical size. Another example is the development and production of substitute products
for CFCs after the latter were regulated by the Montreal Protocol. It is conceivable
that, once the market size of the substitutes became large, DuPont and others producers
stood to gain more from producing the substitutes than from producing CFCs and
thus preferred a treaty with universal participation (e.g. Parson, 2003; Sunstein,
2007). In the context of climate change, network externalities will likely arise in the
deployment of hydrogen-based transportation systems, specifically when combining a
new automobile technology and a supporting infrastructure of fuel supply. Moreover,
3Strategic uncertainty arises not due to stochastic elements in the payoff functions but due to the
uncertainty concerning the actions and beliefs of other players.
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in a network of carbon capture and storage (CCS) operations whose capture and storage
sites are linked to each other by pipelines for carbon dioxide, the costs of accessing the
CCS network facing an emitter are likely decreasing in the number of other emitters
using the network.
For an illustration of the problem we are interested in, we start by discussing a
simple case where countries are grouped into frontrunners and followers , and changing
groups is not allowed.4 Our model setup extends Barrett’s (2006) model of a treaty on
technology adoption. Countries have a choice between conventional abatement q and
the adoption of “breakthrough technology” labeled “Technology X”. The latter has the
distinctive features that it generates zero emissions and exhibits increasing returns to
adoption. In Barrett’s model, a one-shot game is played among N countries, where
pii = bx
*.,xi +
N∑
j,i
x j
+/- −
cx
N
*.,N −
N∑
j,i
x j
+/- xi +
+b
(1 − xi) qi +
N∑
j,i
(1 − x j )qj
 − c0(1 − xi)
q2i
2
(1)
is the payoff function for country i, xi is the indicator of adoption of Technology X
by country i (xi ∈ {0, 1}), qi is country i’s abatement rate by using the conventional
technology, and bx , cx , b, c0 are strictly positive coefficients representing the marginal
benefit of adopting Technology X, the total cost of using Technology X, the marginal
benefit from conventional abatement and the marginal cost of conventional abatement,
respectively. Barrett has shown that this one-shot game gives rise to a “tipping treaty”
as both universal adoption and non-adoption of Technology X are Nash equilibria.
If the equilibria are ranked, successful coordination among the countries in favor of
technology adoption increases the payoff for at least some of them.
Using functional forms similar to Barrett’s, we now show that the addition of
4This assumption is relaxed in Section 3 below, where each country is allowed to switch between
technologies at any time.
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a temporal dimension limits the possibility of coordinated actions by countries and
is conducive to a pattern of indeterminate adoption dynamics. The prospects for
successful coordination are worse than in the one-shot game because some countries
are unable to adopt the technology at a given moment in time.
We consider a game in two stages where each country belongs to one of two
groups, technological frontrunners or followers. Decisions of technology choice by
countries are made sequentially. In period 1, group 1 (i = 1, . . . ,M where M < N −1)
countries – technological frontrunners with the technical capacity to use Technology
X from the beginning – make a decision about whether they introduce Technology
X. Group 2 countries (i = M + 1, ..., N) – followers – acquire the ability to introduce
Technology X only in period 2. The assumption of sequential decisions is chosen
for the sake of simplicity and to reflect two types of costs, namely (i) a prohibitive
cost of reverting from a new abatement technology to the conventional one and (ii)
a prohibitive cost facing some countries associated with the early adoption of a new
technology. These assumptions will be relaxed in Section 3 below where we consider
a simultaneous-moves game and reversible technology choices.
Group 1 countries (frontrunners) adopt Technology X in period 1 if the present
value expected payoff for individual countries favors adoption. That is, when deciding
on adoption or non-adoption, frontrunners seek to maximize their individual payoffs
rather than joint payoffs. The present value expected payoff for countries 1, . . . ,M
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evaluated in period 1 is given by
Πi = pi
t=1
i (x11, . . . , xi1, . . . , xM1) + βE
[
pit=2i (x12, . . . , xi2, . . . , xN2)
]
= bx
*.,xi1 +
M∑
j,i
x j1
+/- −
cx
N
*.,N −
M∑
j,i
x j1
+/- xi1 +
+b
(1 − xi1) qi1 +
M∑
j,i
(1 − x j1)qj1
 − (2)
−c0(1 − xi1)
q2i1
2
+ β
bx
*.,xi2 +
N∑
j,i
x j2
+/- −
cx
N
*.,N −
N∑
j,i
x j2
+/- xi2

+β
b
(1 − xi2) qi2 +
N∑
j,i
(1 − x j2)qj2
 − c(1 − xi2)
q2i2
2

where x jt ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator for country j’s adoption of Technology X in period
t ∈ {1, 2}, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
We now show that , in certain cases, rational decision-making by countries can lead
to more than one possible outcome. Which one of them will be realized depends on
what countries expect at present. Suppose that the adoption of Technology X in period
1 makes frontrunners better off only if Technology X is also adopted by followers in
period 2. This is true if the following conditions are satisfied:5
(
bx − b
2
2c0
)
M − cx
N
(N − M + 1) + b
2
2c0
+ β
[(
bx − b
2
2c0
)
N − cx
N
+
b2
2c0
]
≥ 0 (3)
5Note that a country with the conventional technology abates q = bc0 . For the frontrunners’ payoff
to adoption we use that the payoff is given by Πi = bxM − cxN (N − M + 1)+ β
[
bxN − cxN
]
if in period
2 all followers unanimously adopt Technology X, and by
Πi = bxM − cxN (N − M + 1) + β
[
bxM − cxN (N − M + 1) +
b2
2c0
(N − M)
]
if no follower adopts Technology X. Finally, payoffs are given by Πi = b
2
2c0
(M − 1) + β
[
b2
2c0
(N − 1)
]
if no country adopts X throughout the two periods.
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(
bx − b
2
2c0
)
M − cx
N
(N − M + 1) + b
2
2c0
+
+ β
[(
bx − b
2
2c0
)
M − cx
N
(N − M + 1) + b
2
2c0
]
< 0 (4)
Figure 1 depicts the payoff schedules corresponding to this case. Non-adoption by
all countries in both periods is one Nash equilibrium of the game, yet it is dominated
by the other Nash equilibrium in which all countries adopt by the end of period
2. However, because the decision on technology adoption is taken sequentially, a
coordination problem arises in both periods. For instance, even if frontrunners manage
to coordinate on adoption in period 1, coordination might fail in period 2 as followers
might still choose non-adoption of Technology X. Conversely, conditions (3) and (4)
imply that adoption of Technology X by frontrunners is not optimal if followers do not
follow suit. And followers have no incentive to adopt Technology X if frontrunners
have not adopted Technology X beforehand.
As the incentives of the two groups are interrelated in a circular fashion there ismore
than one possible outcome. The outcome could in fact be determined by frontrunners’
expectations about future actions by followers. Success or failure of treaty coordination
in period 2 – and hence the rate of technology adoption in the future – is subject to
strategic uncertainty in period 1. That is, unless one places additional assumptions
on the structure of expectations, frontrunners decide on technology adoption based on
their beliefs about the future outcome. Despite the subjective nature of these beliefs,
frontrunners determine the eventual adoption rate of Technology X by directly shaping
the followers’ incentive for technology adoption in period 2. As a consequence, the
diffusion of Technology X could be driven by a subjective factor, and followers have
little influence in shaping such subjective beliefs. Previous analyses have given little
attention to this issue, as they have been based on a one-shot game of technology
adoption where the problem of coordination boils down to a matter of successful
political negotiations at one point in time. Such a framework rules out the intertemporal
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Figure 1: Adoption incentives under irreversibility
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coordination problem we examine in this paper.
To be sure, the problem of multiplicity arising in the two-period model we consider
here could be avoided if countries had a way of committing themselves to technology
adoption in the long run, or alternatively, if they firmly expect that the actions taken
by other countries will be collectively rational responses to their own actions, even
in the long run. In practice, however, countries may be hard-pressed to find such a
commitment device given that technology implementation covers a long time span
and that political decision-makers face uncertainty about future election outcomes,
economic growth, and the pace of technological progress. Perhaps as a reflection of
this fact, the Kyoto Protocol had a commitment period of only five years.
The simple model discussed in this section shows that the outcome of a technology-
oriented treaty is partly determined by members’ subjective beliefs about future tech-
nology adoption, or, more precisely, about the collective capacity to coordinate tech-
nology adoption in the future. Countries’ perceptions might be influenced by visi-
ble commitments to solving an international environmental problem, in addition to
adopting the breakthrough technology, such as the voluntary adoption of a long-term
emission target.
3 Indeterminate technology diffusion when countries
choose the time of adoption
This section extends the baseline model by dropping the assumptions of irreversibility
and of a fundamental asymmetry between frontrunners and followers. We rather
allow for technology switching in both ways, i.e. both adoption and abandonment
of Technology X are possible at a cost. We show that the two-stage game can have
multiple equilibria as in the previous section, and that the solutions to the infinite-
horizon game resemble those of the two-period case. We also discuss the equilibrium
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dynamics of the infinite-horizon case.
3.1 Two-period case
Weretain the assumption of twoperiods but nowassume thatM0 countries (0 ≤ M0 ≤ N )
have adopted Technology X already before period 1, and that ∆M1 countries seek the
introduction of Technology X in period 1. Note that here we use a general formulation
of M0 that does not require M0 to be zero (although it can be). In so doing, we account
for the possibility thatTechnology X has been adopted by some countries because of
existing or past treaties, or for reasons unrelated to climate change. By introducing
an assumption of switching cost, which is to be described below, we eliminate the
distinction between frontrunners and followers used in Section 2. That is, the cost
structure and technological capacity are assumed to be identical for all countries, and
all countries can adopt Technology X from period 1.
In addition to the model primitives described in the previous section, we introduce
a term SC representing the marginal costs of switching the technology. We assume
that SC increases with the number of countries switching in the same time period.
This assumption is motivated by the observation that adopting a new technology often
requires the installation of new physical capital. If the industries that provide the
new technology and installation services operate with decreasing returns to scale (e.g.
because some production factors are fixed), the resulting supply curve of installation
services is upward sloping, and hence marginal costs are increasing with the number
of entities switching at a given time.6 A similar logic is used by Mussa (1978) and
Krugman (1991) for their modeling of cross-industry switching costs.
6For example, convex costs are likely to arise when countries switch from nuclear energy to other
forms of carbon-neutral electricity generation, as was decided by the German government after the
Fukushima nuclear accident (“Energiewende”). Since Germany is the only country that has taken
this step so far, it will be able to import cheap nuclear power from other European countries during
the transition to a nuclear free electricity supply. However, if other European countries adopt similar
decisions, this is bound to drive up the initial cost of technology switching as countries would bid up
the price of (nuclear) power. Moreover, unchecked growth in transnational electricity trade could lead
to congestion on the European transmission grid.
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We adopt this formulation to our case and assume that a switching country incurs
costs SC = f∆M1, where f is a positive constant and ∆M1 is the number of countries
adopting Technology X. Note that SC concerns pure adjustment costs for the adopting
countries and is independent of the existing adopters of the technology – hence, it
is not a function of M0 but only of ∆M1. We assume that f > cxN
(
1 + β
)
, i.e. the
switching cost outweighs the (present-value) externality effect on running costs for
Technology X. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that a symmetrical moving cost is
incurred when −∆M1 countries abandon Technology X and switch to the conventional
abatement.
Countries decide upon adoption taking into account the one-time switching cost
as well as the present-value gain associated with using Technology X instead of the
conventional abatement option. Let λ denote this gain. Note that individual countries
make decisions according to their own expected payoffs, and thus λ represents the gain
for individual countries, not for all countries. λ is a function of M0, ∆M1, and ∆M2
(the number of countries that switch technologies in period 2) given by
λ(M0,∆M1,∆M2) = (1 + β)λ1(M0) + λ2(∆M1,∆M2). (5)
where λ1 and λ2 are defined as
λ1(M0) = bx − cxN (N − M0 + 1) −
b2
2c0
(6)
λ2(∆M1,∆M2) = (1 + β)∆M1
cx
N
+ β∆M2
cx
N
(7)
The balance of λ and the switching cost determines the number of adoption or
abandonment of Technology X in period 1. Let us first consider the case of progressive
technology adoption, i.e. the number of adopters of Technology X increases over time.
Then there is a maximum value of ∆M1 (less than N − M0) such that the payoff gain
from switching from conventional abatement to Technology X is positive (recall that
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a larger ∆M1 reduces the expected payoff of adoption because of the switching cost).
In equilibrium, the number of countries switching technologies in period 1, ∆Me1 , is
given by the largest integer to satisfy
λ(M0,∆M1,∆M2) ≥ f∆M1 (8)
In other words,
λ(M0,∆Me1,∆M2) ≥ f∆Me1 (9)
and
λ(M0,∆Me1 + 1,∆M2) < f ·
(
∆Me1 + 1
)
. (10)
By contrast, countries might expect that others will abandon Technology X in
period 2. As Technology X is attractive only with a large number of adopters, the fear
of collective abandonment gives those that have adopted Technology X an incentive
to abandon it. As above, switching costs limit the magnitude of abandonment in this
period. For a set of negative ∆M1 that satisfy
−λ(M0,∆M1,∆M2) ≥ − f∆M1 (11)
the number of countries that abandon Technology X in period 1, ∆Me1 , is given by the
integer with the largest absolute value in this set.
It is straightforward to show possible cases in which the outcome is indeterminate,
so that expectations about future outcomes can influence the future outcomes them-
selves. Figure 2 depicts the case where M0 is located to the left of the tipping point
A – mathematically, λ1(M0) = 0. We prove in the appendix that there is always at
least one combination of (∆M1,∆M2) satisfying (11) and ∆M1,∆M2 ≤ 0 (Figure 2b).
Under certain conditions, there may also be a combination of (∆M1,∆M2) satisfying
(8) and ∆M1,∆M2 ≥ 0 (Figure 2a). To see this, notice that – by a logic similar to the
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Figure 2: Adoption incentives with costly technology switching
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one used to derive condition (8) – the number of countries that adopt Technology X in
period 2, ∆Me2 , is given by the largest integer of ∆M2 to satisfy the inequality
λ1(M0 + ∆M1 + ∆M2) ≥ f∆M2 (12)
The above conditions (8) and (12) are equivalent to:
N
cx
λ1(M0) +
(
1 − f N
cx (1 + β)
)
∆M1 +
β
1 − β∆M2 ≥ 0 (13)
N
cx
λ1(M0) + ∆M1 +
(
1 − f N
cx
)
∆M2 ≥ 0 (14)
and can be satisfied by a set ofweakly positive (∆M1,∆M2). For example, positive∆M1
and ∆M2 exist if f Ncx (1+β) − 1 is very small (recall that, by assumption,
f N
cx (1+β)
− 1 > 0)
and there is a number ∆M2 that satisfies
β
1 − β∆M2 > −
Nλ1(M0)
cx
(note that λ1(M0) < 0). An analogous reasoning can be developed for the case in
which M0 is located to the right of the tipping point.
In summary, we have shown that the dynamics of technology switching may be
uniquely determined in the direction of either increasing adoption or abandonment,
depending on the initial state of technology adoption. However, the system may also
have feasible solutions for both directions of technology adoption and abandonment,
in which case the outcome is determined entirely by countries’ expectations.
3.2 Infinite-horizon game
Here we show that similar patterns to the ones described in the previous section emerge
in the case of an infinite-horizon game of technology adoption. In this setting, the effect
of actions at any given stage is cumulative so that final outcomes differ drastically,
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depending on both the model primitives and players’ expectations. There are two
fundamentally different scenarios. In the first one, the dynamics are determinate, in
the sense that equilibrium play always leads to a unique outcome, either a universal
adoption or zero adoption. In the second scenario, the dynamics are indeterminate,
so that expectations about future outcomes influence the future outcomes themselves,
akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy.
We analyze an infinite-horizon version of the game developed in the previous
section. Play starts in period 0 with an initial number M0 of adopters. As in the
previous section, we assume that 0 ≤ M0 ≤ N to allow for the possibility that some
countries have already adopted Technology X. Countries maximize the present value
of cumulative expected future payoffs associated with their chosen technology. We
focus on subgame perfect equilibria with the feature that countries immediately begin
an optimal transition to either full adoption or no adoption – which one depends on
M0, payoff parameters, and expectations. Once this stage-game Nash equilibrium is
reached, it will be repeated indefinitely as players have no incentives to further deviate.
Since indefinite Nash play is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the continuation game,
we can use backward induction to determine the individually rational transition towards
this state. In the following exposition, we first consider the case in which all countries
eventually become adopters of Technology X. An analogous reasoning can be made
for technology abandonment, as shown below.
Due to switching costs, universal adoption does not occur in a single period but
will take place in L batches ∆M1,∆M2, . . . ,∆ML−1,∆ML where
∑L
l=1 ∆Ml = N − M0.
Consider the last batch of ∆ML = N − ML−1 of adopters. The relative payoff to
adoption for these countries is given by
λL =
1
1 − β
bx − cxN (N − M0 + 1) − b
2
2c0
+
cx
N
*,
L∑
l=1
∆Ml+-
 (15)
ANash equilibrium in this subgame requires that λL ≥ f∆ML where∆ML = N−ML−1.
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Working backwards, in period L − 1 a group of ∆ML−1 countries adopting Technology
X earns relative payoffs
λL−1 =
1
1 − β
bx − cxN (N − M0 + 1) − b
2
2c0
+
cx
N
*,
L−2∑
l=1
∆Ml + ∆ML−1 + β∆ML+-

(16)
For there to be exactly ∆ML−1 adopters in Nash equilibrium, adoption must make all
of them weakly better off, i.e.
λL−1 ≥ f∆ML−1. (17)
However, any additional adopter of Technology X must be strictly worse off:
λL−1 +
cx
N
< f (∆ML−1 + 1). (18)
Iterating backwards, we obtain the relative payoff to adoption on the equilibrium path
for the kth batch of adopters, k ∈ {1, L − 1}
λk =
1
1 − β
bx − cxN (N − M0 + 1) − b
2
2c0
+
cx
N
*,
k−1∑
l=1
∆Ml +
L∑
l=k
βl−k∆Ml+-
 (19)
and the equilibrium conditions
λk ≥ f∆Mk (20)
∧ λk < f∆Mk + f − cxN (21)
For given λk, conditions (20) and (21) pin down the number of adopters in a Nash
equilibrium at stage k. Once all countries have adopted in period L, the relative
payoff to adoption in all subsequent periods τ is constant and given by λL+τ =
1
1−β
[
bx − cxN − b
2
2c0
]
for τ = 0, 1, . . . . Since this term is positive, no country has
an incentive to unilaterally abandon Technology X.
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We use this property to characterize the evolution of the relative payoff to adoption
along the equilibrium path. The relative payoff to adoption for countries in the kth
batch of adopters is given by
λk =
L∑
s=k
βs−k
[
bx − cxN (N − Ms + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
+
βL−k+1
1 − β
[
bx − cxN −
b2
2c0
]
(22)
The difference in the relative payoffs to adoption for two subsequent batches of adopters
k and k+1 can be written as
λk+1 − λk = δλk − (1 + δ)
[
bx − cxN (N − Mk + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
(23)
where δ ≡ 1−ββ . Along with the inequalities (20) and (21), equation (23) characterizes
the dynamics of technology adoption in subgame perfect equilibrium. As in Section
3.1 above, the conditions for an equilibrium in which all countries switch back to the
conventional technology can be derived in an analogous fashion.
3.3 Equilibrium dynamics
To analyze the dynamics of technology adoption along the equilibrium path, it is
convenient to model the rate of technology adoption as a continuous variable γ (0 ≤
γ ≤ 1). The number of countries adopting Technology X is thus given by dγNe.
Similar to the case discussed in the previous section, the equilibrium level of countries
switching at each time period is one that balances the net present value of switching
and the marginal switching costs for all countries. Along the equilibrium path, the net
present value of switching from the conventional abatement to Technology X at period
t is given by
λt =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
bx − cx (1 − γs) − b
2
2c0
]
. (24)
Following the same logic as in the previous sub-sections, the marginal switching
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cost for countries switching technologies between t and t+1 is proportional to (γt+1−γt)
and defined as F (γt+1 − γt) where F is a constant. For λt continuous in γ, conditions
(20) and (21) boil down to the difference equation
F (γt+1 − γt ) = 1
1 + δ
λt+1. (25)
A second difference equation governs the evolution of λt ,
λt+1 − λt = δλt + (1 + δ)
[
bx − cx (1 − γt ) − b
2
2c0
]
. (26)
As the length of a time period goes to zero, the system of difference equations (25)
and (26) can be approximated by the differential equations
F γ˙ =
1
1 + δ
λ (27)
λ˙ = δλ + (1 + δ)
[
bx − cx (1 − γ) − b
2
2c0
]
(28)
This representation allows for a more tractable analysis of the dynamics along the equi-
librium path. Equations (27) and (28) define a system of linear differential equations
the solution to which is given by a combination of exponential functions. If
0 < −bx + cx + b
2
2c0
< cx (29)
the system has a tipping pattern, i.e. both universal adoption and zero adoption of X
are long-run (continuation) equilibria. In this case, the paths of λ and γ are obtained
by tracing them backwards from two long-run equilibria where γ = 0 or γ = 1. The
roots of the exponential functions determining the system are given by
ρ =
1
2
δ ±
√
δ2 − 4cx
F
 (30)
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Note that the roots can be both real and complex depending on the parameter values,
as the term δ2−4cx/F can be either positive or negative. The system dynamics exhibit
remarkable differences depending on which type of root prevails in eq. (30).
With a real root, the system is determinate and hence a sequence of countries’
decisions always lead to a unique outcome. This case is depicted in Figure 3a.
Starting at the tipping point A, either of the two long-run equilibria can be attained
as the dynamics evolve through a sequence of decisions governed by the equilibrium
conditions (27) and (28). The graph shows that each value of γ other thanAcorresponds
to at most one point on one of the two trajectories. In other words, the initial state
of adoption γ0 uniquely determines the long-run diffusion rate of Technology X. If
γ0 > A (γ0 < A) universal (zero) adoption results in long-run equilibrium7.
In contrast, expectations play a prominent role when eq. (30) has a complex root.
In this case, the trajectories show oscillatory patterns, and their arms could cover a
wide range of possible values for γ. When the two arms overlap over an interval of γ
– as is depicted in Figure 3b – the initial state does not determine the direction of the
path. In fact, there is an infinite number of feasible trajectories that the system can take.
Thus, the model primitives do not condition countries to follow a unique equilibrium
path. Rather, it is countries’ expectations about future adoption of Technology X that
pace the growth (or decline) of technology penetration. Even if there is a feasible
equilibrium path leading to the universal adoption of Technology X (for example, the
path through point Pc in Figure 3b), an expectation held by non-adopters that diffusion
will not happen could prevent the initial group of adopters from taking this path.
Instead, they might follow the trajectory to the zero adoption (for example, the path
through point Pd in Figure 3b).
7Adoption could take either of the trajectories if γ0 = A.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium dynamics in the infinite horizon game
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4 Discussion
4.1 Patterns of technology choice
The dynamic model highlights two distinct patterns of technology choice under a
technology treaty which deserve further discussion from a policy point-of-view. In the
determinate case, there is a unique equilibrium path leading to the long-run outcome.
This outcome can be either universal or zero adoption and is uniquely determined by
the initial state of technology adoption γ0 and by the tipping point
γ∗ = 1 −
bx − b22c0
cx
. (31)
Only if the initial proportion of adopters is sufficiently large, γ∗ < γ0, will the
technology be adopted by everyone in the long run.8 Otherwise, all countries will
switch back to the conventional technology. The tipping point is likely to be lower
the more affordable the breakthrough technology, the more expensive the conventional
technology and the larger the relative benefits of Technology X compared to those
associated with the conventional technology. In this scenario, the earlier results by
Barrett (2006) andHoel and de Zeeuw (2010) go through and the coordination problem
is negligible.
However, this is not true if the technology is such that the long-run outcome is
indeterminate and depends on expectations, akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Eq. (30)
implies that this case arises if δ2 < 4cx/F and hence the system of differential equations
has complex roots. It is easily seen from this inequality that a higher discount rate δ
8Conditions (30) and (31) characterize the outcomes of private decisions taken by individual coun-
tries that intertemporally maximize their cumulative payoffs. These outcomes do not necessarily
coincide with the social optimum because individual countries do not consider the external benefits and
costs of their switching decisions. However, similar conditions can be obtained for the social optimum,
as shown in the Appendix. These conditions imply that the tipping point for the social optimum (γˆ∗) is
always lower than the tipping point for private outcomes (γ∗). Intuitively, this property derives from the
fact that technology adoption by one country creates a positive externality for other countries adopting
Technology X.
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and a higher switching cost F parameter both promote determinacy of the system. This
is because both myopia and high costs of technology switching enhance the relative
importance of current over future payoffs, which are subject to strategic uncertainty.
Conversely, a large cx - which implies that the costs of technology adoption very much
depends on the total number of adopters - promotes indeterminacy of the system, as it
makes countries’ present-value expected payoff more susceptible to others’ technology
choices in the future.
4.2 Equilibrium refinements for coordination games
The issue of coordinating play on one of several possible equilibrium outcomes is at
the core of this and other papers on breakthrough technologies. In any coordination
game, players face strategic uncertainty about the decisions taken by other players.
Our theoretical model has shown how introducing dynamics exacerbates strategic
uncertainty by creating indeterminacy. This result highlights the role of expectations
that may affect future technology adoption in a self-fulfilling fashion, leading to the
implication that policy-makers may wish to coordinate expectations on an agreement
with full adoption. An alternative approach would have been to incorporate more
structure on player’s expectations in the model and hence to narrow the scope for
multiplicity.9 In this subsection, we discuss the available game theoretical concepts to
resolve coordination issues and explain why we have refrained from using them.
Schelling (1960) early on pointed out that beliefs and perceptions held by players
can help coordinate expectations on certain outcomes that are focal. This is particu-
larly true of real-life situations where agents’ decisions are embedded in a common
temporal, spatial or cultural context. In the description of the technology adoption
game considered above, however, there is little that would render a particular Nash
equilibrium focal in Schelling’s sense, so this concept is not pursued any further here.
9We thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.
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Harsanyi and Selten (1988) defined the notion of risk dominance as an equilibrium
refinement for (static) coordination games.10 This concept is nicely illustrated for
the stage game depicted in Figure 2a. If all frontrunners expect followers to adopt
Technology X, they play a coordination game with payoffs represented by the solid
lines. It is easily seen that complete adoption by all frontrunners payoff-dominates
the Nash equilibrium with no adoption. However, notice that a deviation by one of
the frontrunners imposes larger losses on the other adopters than would be the case
in the equilibrium with no adoption. Therefore, if frontrunners don’t know for sure
which Nash equilibrium is being played, adopting Technology X is a risky choice
whereas conventional abatement is safe. In other words, the equlibrium without
adoption risk-dominates the equilibrium with complete adoption. Risk dominance
seems particularly plausible if pre-play communication is ineffective at coordinating
expecations, as was conjectured by Aumann (1990). However, at least in two-player
coordination games, lab experiments have shown that cheap talk communication is very
effective at enhancing efficiency of the outcome (Charness, 2000). Moreover, a fair
amount of international diplomacy can be considered cheap talk in a game theoretical
sense, and yet it is the prime method of enhancing the efficiency of intergovernmental
interactions. This (along with the lack of an extensive-form game definition), is the
reason why we do not use risk dominance to select among equilibria.
10For anti-coordination games such as the game of chicken, Aumann (1974) proposed the concept
of correlated equilibrium, where players coordinate expectations on equilibrium play via a third party
that privately instructs players which strategy to play after observing to a randomization device. We
refrain from using correlated equilibria here because, in line with the previous literature, we think
that the choice of the abatement technology is best modeled as a coordination game rather than an
anti-coordination game. Moreover, it would appear heroic to assume that an international body such
as the UNFCCC could assign equilibrium actions to its member states in private. Rather, it seems that
such assignments should be considered public in a post “Wiki leaks” world. As a result, the UNFCCC
could only randomize over Nash equilibria of the game, but this is not very plausible.
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4.3 Social preferences
Our model has emphasized the scale effects of breakthrough technologies which in-
duce strategic complementarity in the adoption process. While the examples for such
technologies given above are well known in the literature, it bears noting that the
fundamental insights of our analysis are much broader. In fact, they equally apply
to any factor capable of creating strategic complementarity in an international envi-
ronmental treaty. For example, Lange and Vogt (2003) show that the introduction
of equity preferences à la Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in Barrett’s (1994) model of
self-enforcing environmental treaties can sustain full cooperation in settings where
regular preferences cannot. This finding is relevant in our context because a large
body of experimental evidence emphasizes the importance of social preferences (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and because concerns about fair-
ness have been shown to matter for those actors involved in international climate
negotiations (Lange et al., 2007, 2010). Wagner (2016) presents empirical evidence
that concerns about reputation and fairness created strategic complementarity in the
ratification process of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer.
Similar to the scale effect of the breakthrough technology, inequality aversion en-
genders strategic complementarity in the payoff to joining a treaty. In particular, when
countries care about a fair distribution of the gains of an international environmental
treaty, the dynamic ratification path can be indeterminate even in the absence of tech-
nology externalities. Given this indeterminacy, participation in the treaty could be
broadened if countries believe that other countries will become adopters in the future
(i.e. ratification becomes the norm), and vice versa. The only difference is that in
equation (30), the technology term cx will be replaced by a parameter measuring the
inequality aversion. We leave a more detailed analysis of such a model as a topic for
future research.
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5 Concluding remarks
Although the 2015 Paris Agreement prominently features a 2-degree-Celsius target
for global warming, it does not stipulate binding targets on carbon emissions. Rather,
member states are called upon to design and implement their ownmitigation measures,
cautiously referred to as “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)”.
According to the EU commission, these INDCs “are not yet enough to keep global
warming below 2°C, but the agreement traces the way to achieving this target.”11 The
theoretical model developed in this paper sheds light on the conditions under which
this statement holds true.
Our analysis is based on a dynamic extension of Barrett’s (2006) model of treaty
formation where countries choose between (i) a conventional abatement technology
that is subject to decreasing returns, and (ii) a “breakthrough technology” that exhibits
a network externality such that the benefit to adoption increases with the number of
other adopters. Countries evaluate these choices taking into account the expected
future benefits and an increasing (in the number of other countries) cost of switching
technologies. We have shown that, under certain conditions, equilibrium technology
choices are indeterminate as they depend on the future adoption rate, which is subject
to strategic uncertainty. An important implication of this is that expectations about the
future outcomes could themselves influence international cooperation under an IEA
that mandates the adoption of a clean technology.
Our analysis highlights the potential of strategic uncertainty to hinder treaty for-
mation and suggests two approaches by which policy can mitigate this problem. The
first approach is to reduce strategic uncertainty by managing expectations. This could
be implemented, for example, by setting long-term, non-binding targets for pollution
emissions or other outcomes, so as to coordinate expectations across countries on
11Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris/index_en.htm, last ac-
cessed on October 31, 2016.
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the path leading to full adoption. As was pointed out above, the fact that limiting
the global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius is the key provision of both the
Copenhagen Accord and the Paris Agreement can be interpreted in this way. This
target does not require any country to reduce its emissions at present, but it aligns
countries’ expectations and thereby ‘tips’ a future technology treaty towards adoption.
The second approach to reducing strategic uncertainty is by choosing technologies
that minimize the potential for indeterminacy of the dynamic system. Instead of
choosing the most efficient breakthrough technology, policymakers might favor a
technology with high switching cost as this locks the frontrunners into their decisions
while also reducing strategic uncertainty of followers. This aspect of technology
adoption arises only in our explicitly dynamic framework and thus constitutes an
important extension of the second-best argument by which technologies with scale
effects are superior to alternative treaty designs even if they come at a higher cost
because they reduce the incentive to free ride (Barrett, 2006).
For the sake of clarity, we have kept the modeling and discussion deliberately
simple. Our analysis can be extended to consider expectation-driven dynamics that
emerge because of sources of strategic complementarities other than a network ex-
ternality, e.g. inequality aversion on the part of treaty participants or trade sanctions
imposed on non signatories. What is more, our analysis could be extended to IEAs that
concern both R&D investment and technology diffusion, and this will require a proper
treatment of irreversibilities. Another relevant extension would examine the scope for
expectations management in an IEA involving the choice among many technologies
that exhibit different cost structures. These and other extensions are left as topics for
future research.
27
References
Aumann, R. (1974). Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 1:67–96.
Aumann, R. (1990). Nash-equilibria are not self-enforcing. In J. Gabszewicz, J.-
F. Richard, L. W., editor, Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and
Optimisation, pages 201–206. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Barrett, S. (1994). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford
Economic Papers, 46(Special Issue):878–94.
Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and Statecraft. Oxford University Press, New York.
Barrett, S. (2006). Climate treaties and ‘breakthrough’ technologies. American Eco-
nomic Review, 96(2):22–25.
Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). Self-centered fairness in games with more
than two players. American Economic Review, 90:166–193.
Charness, G. (2000). Self-serving cheap talk: A test of Aumann’s conjecture. Games
and Economic Behavior, 33:177–194.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K.M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3):817–868.
Gladwell,M. (2000). The TippingPoint: HowLittle ThingsCanMake aBigDifference.
Little, Brown and Company, New York.
Harsanyi, J. and Selten, R. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in
Games. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hoel, M. and de Zeeuw, A. (2010). Can a focus on breakthrough technologies improve
the performance of international environmental agreements? Environmental and
Resource Economics, 47(3):395–406.
28
Krugman, P. (1991). History versus expectations. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
106(2):651–67.
Lange, A., Löschel, A., Vogt, C., and Ziegler, A. (2010). On the self-interested
use of equity in international climate negotiations. European Economic Review,
54(3):359–375.
Lange, A. and Vogt, C. (2003). Cooperation in international environmental negotia-
tions due to a preference for equity. Journal of Public Economics, 87:2049–2067.
Lange, A., Vogt, C., andZiegler, A. (2007). On the importance of equity in international
climate policy: An empirical analysis. Energy Economics, 29(3):545–562.
Mussa, M. (1978). Dynamic adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model.
Journal of Political Economy, 86(5):775–791.
Parson, E. A. (2003). Protecting the Ozone Layer. Science and Strategy. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK.
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W.W. Norton & Co, New
York.
Sunstein, C. (2007). Of Montreal and Kyoto: A tale of two protocols. Harvard
Environmental Law Review, 31(1):1–66.
Wagner, U. J. (2016). Estimating strategic models of international treaty formation.
Review of Economic Studies, 83(4):1741–1778.
29
A Appendix - Not for publication
A.1 Proof.
The given conditions imply −λ(M0, 0, 0)>0 and .−λ1(M0) > 0. Since f > cxN (1 + β),
the function
−λ(M0,∆M1,∆M2) − λ1(−∆M1)
is increasing in ∆M1 (decreasing in −∆M1) and decreasing in ∆M2 (increasing in
−∆M2). As , this means that there is at least one feasible ∆M1 ≤ 0 for all ∆M2
satisfying ∆M2 ≤ 0.
Meanwhile, a negative ∆M2 satisfies the following inequality
−λ1(M0 + ∆M1 + ∆M2) ≥ f (−∆M2)
Since f > cxN (1 + β), the function
−λ1(M0 + ∆M1 + ∆M2) − f (−∆M2)
is increasing in ∆M2 (decreasing in −∆M2). As −λ1(M1) > 0, this means that there is
at least one ∆M2 ≤ 0 that satisfies the above inequality for all ∆M1 such that ∆M1 ≤ 0.
The above means that if M0 is located on the left of the tipping point, there is always a
feasible combination of (∆M1,∆M2) such that ∆M1,∆M2 ≤ 0.
A.2 Difference equation for λ in the discrete game
To characterize the evolution of the relative payoff to adoption, we rewrite the relative
payoff to adoption for adopters in the kth batch of adopters as follows
λk =
L∑
s=k
βs−k
[
bx − cxN (N − Ms + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
+
βL−k+1
1 − β
[
bx − cxN −
b2
2c0
]
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The relative payoff to adoption for the subsequent batch of adopters k+1 is given by
λk+1 =
L∑
s=k+1
βs−(k+1)
[
bx − cxN (N − Ms + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
+
βL−k
1 − β
[
bx − cxN −
b2
2c0
]
Let δ ≡ 1−ββ and calculate
λk+1 − (1 + δ)λk = λk+1 − λ
k
β
=
L∑
s=k+1
βs−(k+1)
[
bx − cxN (N − Ms + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
−
−
L∑
s=k
βs−k−1
[
bx − cxN (N − Ms + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
= − 1
β
[
bx − cxN (N − Mk + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
Simple manipulation of this expression yields
λk+1 − λk = δλk − (1 + δ)
[
bx − cxN (N − Mk + 1) −
b2
2c0
]
(32)
A.3 Difference equation for λ with a continuum of countries
λt =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
bx − cx (1 − γs) − b
2
2c0
]
and
λt+1 =
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t−1
[
bx − cx (1 − γs) − b
2
2c0
]
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Calculate
∆λt+1 − δλt =
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−(t+1)
[
bx − cx (1 − γs) − b
2
2c0
]
−
− (1 + δ)︸  ︷︷  ︸
=1/β
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
bx − cx (1 − γs) − b
2
2c0
]
=
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−(t+1)
[
bx − cx (1 − γs) − b
2
2c0
]
−
−
∞∑
s=t
βs−t−1
[
bx − cx (1 − γs) − b
2
2c0
]
= − 1
β
[
bx − cx (1 − γt ) − b
2
2c0
]
Hence
λt+1 − λt = 1 − β
β
λt − 1
β
[
bx − cx (1 − γt ) − b
2
2c0
]
= δλt − (1 + δ)
[
bx − cx (1 − γt ) − b
2
2c0
]
A.4 Social optimum (in the continuous-time case)
Taking the perspective of the global social planner, the Hamiltonian of the system is
given by
H = Nγ [bx − cx (1 − γ)] + N (1 − γ) b2
2c0
− NF γ˙
2
2
+ N λˆγ˙
where λˆ is the co-state variable representing the shadow value of having an adopter
of Technology X rather than a non-adopter. The control and state variables for the
Hamiltonian are γ˙ and γ . The first-order conditions are:
∂H
∂γ˙
= −NF γ˙ + N λˆ = 0
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d λˆ
dt
=
˙ˆ
λ = δλˆ −
[
2cxγ + bx − cx − b
2
2c0
]
Just as in the case of individual countries’ decision making, this set of equations is
solvable, and now the roots are given by
ρˆ =
1
2
δ ±
√
δ2 − 8cx
F

The tipping point now becomes
γˆ∗ =
1
2
*.,1 −
bx − b22c0
cx
+/-
Note that γ∗ > γˆ∗.
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